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FTER World War I, a handful of European
economies succumbed to hyperinflation. Austria,
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Russia all racked
up enormous price increases, with Germany
recording an astronomical 3.25 million percent in a single
month in 1923. But, since the 1950s, hyperinflation has been
confined to the developing world and the transition
economies. The milder problem of chronic high inflation
ceased to be a problem in the advanced economies in the
1980s and in the developing countries in the 1990s (Chart 1).
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the average rate of infla-
tion dropped from 233 percent a year in 1990–94 to 7 percent
in 2000–02. In the transition economies, the decline over the
same period was even greater, from 363 percent to 16 percent.
And, in developing Asia, always a low-inflation region by
developing country standards, inflation has recently stabilized
at about 5 percent a year.
The benign inflation environment of recent years may lead
some to believe that chronic high inflation and hyperinflation
have been eradicated for good. History suggests that such a
conclusion is not warranted. Mainly to keep this important
issue at the forefront of policy debate, this article reviews the
broad patterns in key macroeconomic policies and outcomes
in all episodes of hyperinflation that have occurred in market
economies since the mid-1950s. Following Philip Cagan’s
classic definition of hyperinflation, published in 1956, we
define a hyperinflation episode as beginning in the month
that the rise in prices exceeds 50 percent and as ending the
month before the monthly rise in prices drops below that rate
and stays below it for at least a year. Since the late 1950s, all
episodes of this kind not associated with armed conflicts
(domestic or foreign) have occurred in countries that already
had a history of chronically high inflation: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, and Peru. For comparison, our analysis also includes
Ukraine, which, of the former Soviet republics, suffered the
longest-lasting high inflation.
Beginning and end
Modern episodes of hyperinflation are different from those
that followed World War I. The hyperinflations of the 1920s
sprang up swiftly and were rapidly brought to an end,
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without much cost to employment and output, after govern-
ments implemented drastic fiscal and monetary reforms that
restored currency convertibility and gave central banks inde-
pendence to conduct monetary policy.
In contrast, modern hyperinflations have not been short
and swift. In most cases, they have been preceded by years of
chronic high inflation. In Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, for
example, year-over-year inflation remained consistently
above 40 percent for 12–15 years before the peak of the
hyperinflation (Table 1). Chronic high inflation does not
necessarily degenerate into hyperinflation. But, in the five
countries reviewed here, hyperinflation did ensue, triggered
by an uncontrolled expansion in the money supply that was
fueled by endemic fiscal imbalances.
Nor has price stability been restored overnight in modern
hyperinflations. It took 14 months in Bolivia and more than
3 years in Peru for inflation rates to fall below 40 percent. It
took even longer to reach single-digit inflation rates—three
and a half years in Argentina and about seven and a half
years in Bolivia. In Brazil, failure to put in place the needed
fiscal and monetary reforms in 1989–90 caused the country
to experience a second, borderline hyperinflation in 1994.
Another difference is that full currency convertibility and
strict institutional constraints on monetary policy have not
characterized the end of all modern hyperinflations. Except for
Argentina, which adopted a currency board in early 1991,
countries have relied on hybrid monetary and exchange
regimes to bring high inflation under control. Bolivia and Peru
relied on money targets and heavy foreign exchange interven-
tion (“dirty floats”); Brazil and Ukraine retained de jure dual
exchange rates for most of the 1990s.
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (various years).
Chart 1
Vanishing inflation?
Average annual inflation rates are declining in most regions. 
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Table 1
Modern hyperinflation
A short history of episodes in five countries
Length of time annual
inflation exceeded
40 percent
Peak 12-month
inflation rate Before After Main nominal
Episode (percent) the peak the peak anchor Exchange rate regime
Argentina 20,266 15 years, 1 year, Exchange rate Currency board, April 1991–December 1, 2001.
May 1989–March 1990 (March 1990) 2 months 10 months
Bolivia 23,447 3 years, 1 year, Money supply Dirty float, August 1985–October 1987.
April 1984–September 1985 (August 1985) 5 months 2 months De facto crawling peg thereafter.
Brazil 6,821 14 years, 5 years, Exchange rate Short-lived disinflation (Collor plan). Inflation 
December 1989–March 1990 (April 1990) 3 months 1 month rose steadily from July 1991 to June 1994, 
when the Real Plan, based on a preannounced 
narrow crawling band, was adopted. The band 
collapsed in January 1999 and was replaced 
by a managed float.
Peru 12,378 12 years, 3 years, Money supply Exchange markets were unified in August 1990, 
July 1990–August 1990 (August 1990) 5 months 3 months and the exchange rate floated until October 1993.
De facto crawling band thereafter.
Ukraine 10,155 11 months 2 years, Hybrid Dual exchange markets with periodic attempts
April 1991–November 1994 (December 1993) 10 months to peg official rate. Exchange markets unified 
in September 1998. De facto crawling peg 
thereafter.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Fischer, Sahay, and Végh (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2002); Reinhart and Savastano (2002).
Lingering effects
Major fiscal adjustments have been needed to end all mod-
ern hyperinflations (Table 2). In fact, except for Brazil, coun-
tries that stopped hyperinflations reduced their fiscal deficits
by more than 10 percent of GDP, on average, over a three-
year period.
Although these countries successfully arrested the collapse
of economic activity in the wake of an inflation explosion,
output growth has been modest in nearly all of them. This
suggests that there are reasons to be cautious about what to
expect from macroeconomic policies
after hyperinflations end (Chart 2).
One reason the successful disinfla-
tions were not immediately followed
by an economic rebound was the ane-
mic state of the banking sector in the
affected countries. Hyperinflation
reduces the size of the financial sector
and gradually erodes the efficiency of
the price system and the usefulness of
domestic money as a store of value,
unit of account, and medium of
exchange—taking the economy, in the
extreme, to a near state of barter. In
Bolivia, bank deposits fell to a low of
2 percent of GDP the year after hyper-
inflation began. Although deposits
and monetary aggregates do recover
after hyperinflation ends, intermedia-
tion remains extremely low by international standards. For
instance, the ratio of bank deposits to GDP in the four Latin
American countries ranged from 9 percent to 20 percent
three years after the hyperinflation, which is between one-
third and one-half the comparable ratio for middle-income
countries with no history of high inflation (Chart 3).
Owing to the collapse of financial intermediation, banking
crises have been a feature of all modern hyperinflations. The
large-scale deposit withdrawals and sharp increases in nonper-
forming loans that accompanied economic contraction made
these banking crises extremely costly. Modern hyperinflations
have also occurred when the affected countries had no access to
international capital markets. Four of the countries reviewed had
already defaulted on their foreign currency bank debt when
hyperinflation began, and hyperinflation triggered new defaults.
The run-up to hyperinflation has been characterized by a
broad array of economic distortions, including capital con-
trols, many forms of financial repression, segmented foreign
exchange markets, and outright corruption. Although many
of these distortions are hard to measure, the parallel
exchange rate market premium has been found to be a useful
proxy. As shown in Table 3, the parallel market premium
during the hyperinflation or the run-up to the hyperinfla-
tion has consistently remained above 50 percent, and premi-
ums in the hundreds and even thousands have not been
uncommon. Easing or lifting capital controls and unifying
exchange markets have been critical to reducing some of
these distortions during stabilization. These measures—
together with strict fiscal policies—have usually led to dra-
matic declines in parallel market premiums.
While robust growth has eluded most countries in the years
immediately following a bout of hyperinflation, there is mod-
estly encouraging evidence that, although it may take some
time for countries to regain formal access to international cap-
ital markets, an acute financing shortage may be somewhat
mitigated by the repatriation of flight capital. Table 3 shows
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Table 3
Signs of recovery
Parallel market premiums fall and capital flight abates when 
hyperinflation ends.
Average parallel market premium1
(percent)
t–3 t t+3
Argentina (1989–90) 66.7 67.7 10.9
Bolivia (1984–85) 54.0 119.1 7.3
Brazil  (1989–90)  111.5 102.3 18.1
Peru (1990) 278.8 32.7 6.4
Ukraine (1991–94) n.a. n.a. 11.1
Cumulative capital flight2
(million dollars)
From t–3 to t During t From t to t+3
Argentina (1989–90) 8,662 7,938 –27,434
Bolivia (1984–85) 73 190 –70
Brazil (1989–90) 38,757 –8,932 –30,476
Peru (1990) 2,310 –669 –11,318
Sources:  World Currency Yearbook (various issues); Reinhart and Savastano
(2002).
Note: t refers to the hyperinflation years (in parentheses). n.a. denotes not
available.
1The parallel market premium is defined as 100*(ep-e)/e, where ep is the par-
allel market exchange rate, and e is the official exchange rate. For Argentina,
Brazil, and Peru, the estimates of capital flight end in 1992 (that is, t+2). n.a.
denotes not available.
2A positive entry indicates capital flight (an outflow); a negative, capital repatria-
tion (an inflow). 
Table 2
Fiscal roots
Reducing fiscal deficits is essential to getting inflation rates down.
Annual inflation rate
(percent, average)
t–3 t–2 t–1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Argentina (1989–90) 90.1 131.3 343.0 2,697.0 171.7 24.9 10.6
Bolivia (1984–85) 32.1 123.5 275.6 6,515.5 276.3 14.6 16.0
Brazil (1989–90) 147.1 228.3 629.1 2,189.2 477.4 1,022.5 1,927.4
Peru (1990) 86.3 667.3 3,398.5 7,485.8 409.5 73.5 48.6
Ukraine (1991–94) n.a. 2.1 4.2 1,613.7 376.4 80.2 15.9
Fiscal deficit/GDP1
(percent)
t–3 t–2 t–1 t t+1 t+2 t+3
Argentina (1989–90) 4.2 6.7 8.6 4.9 1.7 –0.4 0.2
Bolivia (1984–85) 7.8 14.7 19.1 16.7 2.5 7.4 5.7
Brazil  (1989–90) 11.3 32.3 53.0 56.3 27.2 44.2 58.1
Operational deficit 3.6 5.7 4.8 2.8 0.0 –2.2 0.3
Peru (1990) 9.0 6.4 7.2 7.4 1.4 2.6 2.7
Ukraine (1991–94) n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.1 8.7 4.9 3.2
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years); Reinhart and Savastano (2002).
Note: t refers to the hyperinflation years (in parentheses). n.a. denotes not available.
1Nonfinancial public sector or general government. Excludes quasi-fiscal losses.
that capital flight is sizable before and during hyperinflations.
Yet once confidence is restored through stabilization, at least
some of the wealth previously kept outside the country
returns to the domestic financial system, although not enough
to jump-start growth. Although the return of flight capital
facilitates financial reintermediation, it rarely increases
demand for domestic money or domestic financial assets.
Dollarization and other forms of financial indexation are a
lasting legacy of hyperinflation—a legacy that has been
extremely difficult to reverse (Chart 3, bottom panel).
Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, for example, were far more dol-
larized three years after hyperinflation than they were before.
Seven lessons to remember
Policymakers would do well to bear in mind the seven lessons
that emerge from this overview of modern hyperinflations.
1. Hyperinflations seldom materialize overnight and are
usually preceded by a protracted period of high and variable
inflation.
2. Stabilization may take years if fiscal policies are not
adjusted appropriately. Even when fiscal adjustment is
implemented, it takes time to achieve low inflation, especially
when money is used as the nominal anchor.
3. Sharp reductions in fiscal deficits are always a critical
element of a stabilization program, regardless of the choice
of monetary anchor.
4. Unifying exchange markets and establishing currency
convertibility are often essential ingredients of stabilization,
irrespective of the choice of main nominal anchor.
5. Output collapses during, and sometimes in the run-up
to, hyperinflation. Although stabilization measures cap the
implosion in economic activity, there is little evidence to sug-
gest that they kindle a robust rebound in economic activity.
6. Hyperinflations are accompanied by an abrupt reduc-
tion in financial intermediation.
7. Stopping a hyperinflation does not restore demand for
domestic money and domestic currency assets to the levels
that prevailed before the hyperinflation began. Capital
returns to the country when high inflation stops, but dollar-
ization and other forms of indexation dominate financial
intermediation for many years.
Carmen M. Reinhart is a Deputy Director, and Miguel A.
Savastano is an Advisor, in the IMF’s Research Department.
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Source:  Reinhart and Savastano (2002).
Note:  t refers to the hyperinflation years (in parentheses). Data were not 
available for Ukraine, t–3.
1Excludes government securities held in banks.
2Brazil did not allow banks to offer foreign currency deposits.
3U.S. dollar deposits were forcibly converted into local currency in 1982. 
Foreign currency deposits were allowed again in 1985.
4U.S. dollar deposits were forcibly converted into local currency in 1985. 
Foreign currency deposits were allowed again in 1988. 
Chart 3
Collateral damage
Hyperinflations cripple the banking sector and increase the 
demand for dollar assets.
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Chart 2
How large is the rebound?
Stabilization policies can only do so much to redress
economic collapse.
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